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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE: / 
SERGE B. GUDMUNDSEN, / NO. 14580 
Disciplinary Proceeding. / 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by the Board of Commissioners 
of the Utah State Bar seeking the imposition of disciplinary 
proceedings as against the Appellant herein. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DISCIPLINE 
The Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar made 
findings in violation of specific sections of the Violations 
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Canons of Judicial 
Ethics by the Appellant in regards to his relationship with 
the matter of Verus Thornley v. J. Christensen and the Appellant's 
relationship with a client, namely Mr. and Mrs. Charles T. Hales. 
The Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar made 
recommendations to the Utah Supreme Court, that the Appellant, 
Serge B. Gudmundson, be suspended from the practice of Law 
until he can satisfy the Board of Commissioners of the Utah 
State Bar and the Utah Supreme Court, that he is competent 
to practice law in the State of Utah. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant seeks reversal of the Findings of Fact 
and recommendations of the Board of Commissioners of the Utah 
State Bar, that Appellant be suspended from the practice of 
law, and a reversal of the Findings that the conduct of the 
Appellant in regards to the two matters presented before the 
Board at its hearings warrant the recommendation made to this 
Honorable Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The matter before the Board of Commissioners was partially 
founded on Complaint made by Mr. and Mrs. Charles T. Hales 
of Fielding, Utah, wherein the services of the Appellant was 
retained on October 18, 1972 (TR-20), to defend the parties 
on charges of drunken driving and public intoxication (TR-
24). The original place of trial set for the Hales was in 
Tremonton (Dep.35) and the Appellant made an appearance for the 
Hales in Tremonton and obtained a Change of Venue from Tremonton 
to Brigham City for the matter. (TR-35) 
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Subsequently a jury trial was held in both matters in 
the City Court of Brigham City, wherein Mr. Hales was acquitted 
and Mrs. Hales was convicted. (TR-35) 
The Appellant thereupon filed an Appeal to the District 
Court in Box Elder County on behalf of~Mrs. Hales, and through 
a series of postponements of the actual trial of Mrs. Hales, 
the matter was subsequently dismissed through the efforts of 
the Appellant. (TR-36) 
The services theretofore rendered by the Appellant on 
behalf of the Hales was appearance in Tremonton for Change 
of Venue, then a subsequent trial for both of the individuals 
before a jury in the City Court of Brigham City, and subsequently 
an Appeal from the conviction of Mrs. Hales from the City Court 
to the District Court with an ultimate dismissal of the matter 
against Mrs. Hales. Two jury trials were held as to the two 
Defendants, the Hales, in the matter wherein the Appellant 
appeared for the parties. (TR-36) 
The Appellant was paid the sum of $2,200.00 by the Hales 
in the defense of both of the Hales of the criminal matters 
brought against them and for a civil action against the police 
officers who made the arrest. Pursuit of the civil matter 
was never undertaken by the Appellant. (St.Exh.l) 
The Appellant admitted to the Hales and to their Attorney, 
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Mr. Farr, that monies was due and owing as refund for some 
of the fees paid by Hales to the Appellant, but no sum had 
been worked out as to the value of services rendered by the 
Appellant on behalf of the Hales. (St.Exh.l) 
The matter as against Mrs* Hales was not dismissed until 
September or October, 1973 (R-45), and the Hales had retained 
Mr. Lionel Farr to seek a refund for them in December, 1973. 
(TR-45) 
Even though the Hales had retained Mr. Farr in December, 
1973, to seek a refund, as late as April 29, 1974, Mr. Hales 
had authorized the Appellant to pursue his civil suit, even 
though he had already hired Lionel Farr to get a refund of 
his fees from the Appellant. (TR-54) 
In March 15, 1974, Mr. Lionel Farr was advised of the 
eye surgery to be performed upon the Appellant (TR-78), and 
the Appellant had not been able to practice law since April, 
1974, to present date because of multiple surgical operations 
on both eyes. (TR-85) The Appellant has made a refund of fees 
remaining to the Hales and a Satisfaction of Judgment has been 
filed by Mr. Farr on behalf of his clients, the Hales. (Exh.A 
attached) 
The second matter considered by the Bar Commission was 
the employment of the Appellant on September 11, 1972, to 
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represent Mrs. Verus N. Thornley and her minor son on a criminal 
complaint and to institute a civil suit against the complainant 
neighbor. (TR-88) 
The client paid a fee to the Appellant for handling 
the two criminal matters and the civil matter in the sum of 
$1,500.00. (TR-90) 
A jury trial was held in the criminal matter concerning 
Mrs. Thornley in the City Court and she was convicted of the 
criminal offense. (TR-117) 
A Notice and Appeal was taken in the matter from the 
City Court to the District Court (TR-118) and a jury trial 
was thereafter held in the District Court and Mrs. Thornley 
was acquitted in that matter. 
A civil suit was subsequently filed by the Appellant 
on behalf of Mrs. Thornley in the District Court seeking damages 
for malicious prosecution. Appellant advised Mrs. Thornley 
that he had invested hours and hours of research upon the matter 
of the civil suit and that he advised Mrs. Thornley that if 
she stopped the civil suitr that there would be very little 
refund because of the time the Appellant had put into the case. 
(TR-100) 
The Deposition was taken of Mrs. Thornley, which was 
attended to by the Appellant (R-119). The Deposition of the 
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complainant in the criminal matter against Mrs. Thornley/ a 
Mr, Christensenf and who was also the Defendant in the civil 
action was taken by the Appellant in February, 1974, with Mrs. 
Thornley testifying that she was present at both instances 
(TR-103). 
The charge against Mrs* Thornleyfs son was dismissed 
in Juvenile Court. 
Mrs. Thornley testified that she was advised by the 
Appellant, that the $1/500.00 which had been paid to handle 
all of the matters would not result in any additional charges, 
even though an Appeal to the District Court and taking of Deposition 
had occurred/ and that there would be no charge of any additional 
cost as to the conduct of her criminal and civil matters. (TR-
118) 
Mrs. Thornley further testified/ that at no time did 
she request an accounting from the Appellant; that she did 
not have any knowledge of the research in the matter invested 
by the Appellant. (TR-128) 
Mrs. Thornley testified under oath/ that she did not 
pay the Appellant any monies for cost of filing the Complaint 
nor for taking of the Deposition and attending the other Deposition, 
which was taken of Mrs. Thornley (TR-128). 
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The Complaint of the Board of Bar Commissioners sets 
forth as an admission, that the Appellant was physically disabled 
subsequently to having undertaken the matter on behalf of 
Verus N. Thornley (R-4), and also subsequent to undertaking 
the handling of the matter for the Hales (R-5). 
The Appellant was still disabled as of December 10/ 1975 
(R-7)• The Record further shows that at the time of the hearing 
in this instant matter before the Board of Bar Commissioners, 
in the instant matter of the Findings of Fact and Recommendations 
of the Board of Bar Commissioners as presently before this 
Court, that the Appellant was unable because of his physical 
disability to attend at his hearing, that he had four cateract 
operations, twice on each eye, and that he could not see and 
had very limited vision and could not travel to Salt Lake City 
for his hearing. (TR-5) 
The ruling of the Board was that the proceedings would 
go forward in the matter of the discipline of the Appellant 
without his presence, "That we have given as much time as we 
can to Mr. Gudmundsen". (TR-6) 
Counsel for Appellant entered into the Record, that in 
each instance of a calling of hearing, that there was a medical 
report from a doctor accompanying request for continuances (R-6), 
and that the Commissioners made a record of admission of notices 
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from medical doctors of the requests for continuance because 
of the disability of the Appellant and from letters from Counsel 
for Appellant requesting such continuances reflecting the dis-
ability of the Appellant. (Dep.71 
The Record before the Court from the Board of Bar 
Commissioners reflected that the matter did continue and a 
hearing was held without the presence of the Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DUE PROCESS REQUIRES ADEQUATE HEARING. 
It is submitted to this Honorable Court, that the 
exhibits and records before this Court, including the findings 
entered by the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar 
evidence that the Appellant was not physically capable of being 
present for his defense, in that he was suffering from physical 
disability because of a multiple surgical intervention necessitated 
four times upon the eyes of the Appellant (TR-5), made difficult 
and almost impossible any valid defense to be presented by the 
Appellant before the Board. 
There was a decision by the Board of Commissioners, that 
the trial of the Disciplinary Hearings as against the Appellant 
would be held regardless of his presence, in that the Appellant 
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had Counsel present/ and it was alleged by the Board, that 
an adequate defense of the Appellant could be made by Counsel 
for Appellant without the necessity of his client being present. 
(TR-6) 
An examination of the Transcript from the Court will 
evidence that the Counsel for the Appellant was indeed unable 
to make an adequate defense of his client, the Appellant herein, 
in that a strict interpretation of the rules of evidence was 
determined to be the proper manner of proceeding by the Board 
of Commissioners/ and therefore. Counsel for Appellant was 
repeatedly denied opportunities to introduce matters in contra-
diction and mitigation of testimony of the adverse witnesses 
by reason of the absence of the Appellant. 
POINT II 
DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEY SHOULD NOT BE PUNITIVE. 
In Geer v. Stathopulos, 390 P.2d 606, Sup.Ct. of Colo., 
the Court stated: 
That capricious or arbitrary exercise of discretion 
by the administrative Board can arise, by exercise 
of its discretion in such a manner after consideration 
of evidence before it, has clearly indicated that 
its action was based on conclusions from the evidence 
such that reasonable men fairly and honestly con-
sidering the evidence must reach contrary conclusions. 
The Colorado Supreme Court further stated the abiding 
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and well based principle, that when a Court is called upon to 
review action of an administrative agency, it should be placed 
in the same position as such agency, and therefore, if the 
agency has some knowledge of some fact, and it acts upon such 
knowledge, it should see to it that what it knows becomes part 
of the record in order to permit the reviewing Court to evaluate 
the matter so known. 
It is submitted to this Honorable Court, that in the 
instant matter before the Court, the record as evidenced by the 
transcript of the proceedings, evidences that the Board did not 
desire to place into evidence all materials that would be of aid 
to this Honorable Court, as the Court of ultimate authority and 
the reviewing Court in such matters, so that this Court would 
have before it all of the records available in the records of 
the Board of Commissioners to draw its own conclusions as to 
whether or not the conduct of the Appellant had been wrongful 
and in violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics for which 
the Appellant has been charged. 
It is submitted to the Court, that the principle of law 
set forth in Marks v. France, 325 P.2d 368, may be applicable in 
the instant situation where the Court stated that an administrative 
body, such as the Board of Examiners in Optometry, cannot be the 
final judge of reasonableness of its orders, and while Courts 
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will not be permitted to substitute their judgment for that of 
administrative bodiesf nevertheless Courts are definitely charged 
with the solemn duty of determining whether the procedure 
employed in reaching judgment, or whether judgment itself as 
rendered/ is unreasonable, arbitrary, or oppressive under cir-
cumstances of each particular case. 
The record as to both of the complainant parties, namely 
the Thornleys and the Hales, evidences a great amount of work 
performed by the Attorney, the Appellant herein, and also an 
attempt by the clients to establish their concept of what their 
fee should be after having been cleared of all criminal charges 
against them through the capability of the Appellant in handling 
the defenses necessary in their actions. 
The Statutes of the State of Utah at 78-51-16, Utah Code 
Annotated, as amended 1953, specifically give the Appellant 
as a member of the Utah State Bar the right to defend himself 
by the introduction of evidence and the examination of witnesses 
called against him, and that it is obviously apparent that 
if the Appellant is physically unable to attend at his own 
hearing and his Counsel cannot introduce, under the Rules of 
Evidence established by the Board, those matters in refutation 
and mitigation of the testimony of witnesses testifying against 
the Appellant, then there is no way in which the Appellant 
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can have been allowed his right of hearing as provided for 
under this Statute. 
It is further submitted to this Court, that in accordance 
with 78-51-41, Utah Code Annotated, as amended 1953, that the 
compensation of an Attorney and Counselor for his services 
is governed by agreement, expressed or implied, which is not 
restrained by law. 
The Appellant recognizes the rights of the Court and 
Board of Commissioners to consider whether or not a charge 
is so outrageous as to be in violation of the Canons of Ethics 
reflecting a reasonableness of fee, but that this should not 
be interpreted as taking away from an attorney the right to 
recover the value of his services and be paid for his efforts 
expended on behalf of clients. The client should not be allowed 
to establish what shall constitute fair compensation for an 
Attorney as determined by the client after the client has been 
relieved of the fear of criminal punishment by the success 
of Counselor for the client in eliminating criminal charges 
against the client. 
In mitigation of the findings against the Appellant, it 
is submitted to this Honorable Court, that the Appellant has not 
been engaged in the practice of law due to his surgical inter-
ventions and physical disabilities for more then two years, 
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and that in accordance with the Affidavit hereto attached by 
Counsel for the Appellant, there has been a satisfactory settle-
ment as to the complainants in both the Thornley and Hales 
matter as to any claim they might have for excess attorney's 
fees and as set forth in Exhibit A hereto attached, which is 
the Affidavit of Counsel, and is provided so that this Honorable 
Court can have before it all matters necessary to consider 
a just verdict as to any disciplinary action that is sought 
to be imposed upon the Appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
It is, therefore, submitted to this Honorable Court, that 
consideration should be given to the type of defense that was 
afforded to the Appellant due to his physical inability to be 
present at his defense and aid in his own presentation of evidence 
of those testifying against him; that the Appellant has not engaged 
in the practice of law for a considerable period of time and will 
not be engaged in the practice of law for some period in the 
future, and further, that the claims, if any, of the complainants 
has been satisfied as set forth in Exhibit A hereto attached. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~^FETE U. VLAHOS ( ^ 
Attorney for Appellant 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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Schedule A 
SS 
AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WEBER: 
PETE N. VLAHOS, being first duly sworn upon his oath, 
deposes and states: 
That he has at all times pertinent hereto been Counsel 
for Appellant, Serge B. Gudmundson, and that all claims of 
Verus Thornley and Mr. and Mrs. Charles T. Hales have been paid 
and an Accord and Satisfaction, together with Satisfaction of 
Judgment, have been entered as to the claims of the aforesaid 
parties, and that there is no indebtedness whatsoever as between 
Serge B. Gudmundson and the claimants. 
Further, Affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this // day of June, 1976. 
PETE^U. VLAHO^, Afflant 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /{ day of 
June, 1976. ^ i—/'-
NOTARY PUBLIC 
cResiding at Ogden, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
7/1/77 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
A copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant was posted 
in the U.S. mail postage prepaid and addressed to the Attorney 
for the Respondent, P. Keith Nelson, 716 Newhouse Building, Sali 
Lake City, Utah 84111, on this j j _ day of June, 1976. 
< _ s/k 
/Jeannme Stowell, Secretary 
